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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. INITIATION OF ACTION
A. Jurisdiction
Developments in this area were most noticeable in disputes
concerning in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.
Analysis of the case law is complicated by a series of decisions
declaring unconstitutional the state's long-arm statute' and the
subsequent reenactment of the statute' which has been upheld in
several court decisions.3 Triplett v. R.M. Wade & Co.4 amply
demonstrates the difficulties in this analysis because the action
was commenced prior to the reenactment.
In Triplett an Oregon corporation, a manufacturer of pipe-
coupling devices, was served with summonses5 in wrongful death
and survival actions arising from an alleged malfunction of its
product in South Carolina. The defendant appeared specially to
contest jurisdiction. Although the defendant corporation was not
domesticated in South Carolina and had no agents or property in
the state, the trial judge upheld jurisdiction. His decision was
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803 (1962). For cases declaring parts of this statute uncon-
stitutional see Comment, 24 S.C.L. REv. 474 (1972). The defect of the statute was techni-
cal, not related to its substantive provisions. See note 26, infra and accompanying text.
2. No. 1343, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2518.
3. Howard v. Allen, 368 F. Supp. 310 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir.
1974); Segars v. Gomez, 360 F. Supp. 50 (D.S.C. 1972).
4. 200 S.E.2d 375 (S.C. 1973).
5. The defendant corporation was served pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-424
(1962):
Service on foreign corporations generally.-If the suit be against a foreign corpo-
ration other than a foreign insurance company the summons and any other legal
paper may be served by delivering a copy to any officer, agent or employee of
the corporation found at the place within this State designated by the stipula-
tion or declaration filed by the corporation pursuant to § 12-721. But if such
foreign corporation transacts business in this State without complying with that
section such service may be made by leaving a copy of the paper with a fee of
one dollar in the hands of the Secretary of State or in his office, and such service
shall be deemed sufficient service and shall have like force and effect in all
respects as service upon citizens of this State found within its limits if notice of
such service and a copy of the paper served are forthwith sent by registered mail
by the plaintiff to the defendant foreign corporation and the defendant's return
receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance therewith are filed in the cause
and submitted to the court from which such process or other paper issued.
Such service may also be made by delivery of a copy thereof to any such
corporation outside the State, and proof of such delivery may be made by the
affidavit of the person delivering such copy. Such affidavit shall be filed in the
cause and submitted to the court from which the process or other paper issued.
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affirmed by the supreme court with two justices dissenting. Al-
though the appellant raised several questions, the court resolved
the case on the single question of whether such assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation met due process
requirements under the United States Supreme Court standard
of "fair play and substantial justice."' The court analyzed the
relationship between the defendant and its southeastern distribu-
ter, a Virginia corporation, but found that the only real connec-
tion between the distributor and South Carolina was that the
state was within the territory served. The defendant reserved the
right to sell to irrigation and farming enterprises and to various
specifically named customers independent of its southeastern dis-
tributor. But the dissent points out that the record shows
[T]he only connection that the appellant had with South Caro-
lina was (1) its couplers were being used by Lone Star Industries
in Columbia, S.C.; and (2) after the accident happened, a repre-
sentative of the appellant came to Columbia to investi-
gate. .... I
Although the dissent's view may be somewhat too severe, the
record reveals very little contact of a substantive nature. The
court itself notes that on the issue of jurisdiction the respondent
supplied only the barest of facts. 8 Coupling devices were found in
stock at a local farming and irrigation supply store, and two Wade
publications were obtained by Lone Star, deceased's employer,
prior to the accident. The court's decision, rather than being
reached factually, seems conclusory in nature, for the court said:
We deem to be immaterial, however, the precise means by
which Lone Star acquired its couplers, it being readily inferable
that such were acquired through one of Wade's designated chan-
nels for marketing the same in South Carolina.9
The court thus deemed the trial court's finding of facts to be
supported by reasonable inferences from the evidence.
6. 200 S.E.2d at 376.
7. Id. at 383. The dissent pointed out that one of the commentaries supports the view
that, without more, the presence of an agent in a state for the sole purpose of investigating
a single claim does not qualify a corporation as transacting business. 20 C.J.S.
Corporations § 1920(e)(3) (1940).
8. 200 S.E.2d at 376.
9. Id. at 378.
1974]
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The decision is somewhat surprising in view of the holding
in Phillips v. Knapp-Monarch Co.'":
The fact, alone, that products manufactured by the defendant
and bearing its trade name passed through the channels of trade
into South Carolina and were here resold by independent mer-
chants, did not constitute the transaction of business by the
defendant in this state."
The plaintiffs in both cases relied on service of process under
section 10-424 of the Code; yet the majority here dismissed Phil-
lips as factually dissimilar, while the dissent regarded it as con-
trolling. A possible distinction is that in Phillips the plaintiff
knew and reported too much about the product. However by
merely asserting his claim and meager facts, the plaintiff in Tri-
plett transferred his burden to the defendant, who, in attacking
jurisdiction, supplied just enough information to support the in-
ferences on which the decision was based.'" As evidenced by the
split decision, either result is arguably worthy of support. But
aside from the factual distinctions, there seems to be an underly-
ing reason for the majority decision. That is the notice given to
the "legislative intent to broaden the concept of what constitutes
transacting business in the State. . . and to extend South Caro-
lina's jurisdiction accordingly.' 3 Viewed in this perspective,
Triplett seems to be a hybrid, spawned by the unusual circum-
stances existing after the demise of the long-arm statute. While
arguably being an extension of previous section 10-424 jurisdic-
tion, the majority's decision probably rests on the lingering spirit
of the long-arm statute.
In personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was up-
held in a federal diversity action in Lee v. Walworth Valve Co."
A Washington corporation was held amenable to suit in South
Carolina though the alleged act did not occur in the state. A
member of the United States Navy was killed on board a ship at
sea, due to an allegedly faulty steam valve manufactured by de-
fendant. The court noted that because the injury did not occur
10. 245 S.C. 383, 140 S.E.2d 786 (1965).
11. Id. at 384, 140 S.E.2d at 787.
12. In Phillips plaintiff was the retailer of the defective product and admitted that
he had purchased the product from an out-of-state wholesaler having no affiliation with
the manufacturer.
13. 200 S.E.2d at 378-79.
14. 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 26
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in any state, there were two possible forums: defendant's home
state and South Carolina, home of the surviving spouse. Conclud-
ing that no jurisdictional problem would have existed if the injury
had occurred in South Carolina, the court found jurisdiction
based on the combination of four factors: plaintiff's interest in
having the trial in the forum of residence, the state's substantial
interest in the controversy, defendant's substantial and continu-
ing contacts with the state, and the fact that the cause of the
action itself suggested no forum.' 5 Of these factors, the court em-
phasized the paternal nature of South Carolina's interest in the
controversy in allowing recovery of appropriate compensation by
one of its citizens if there is a substantive cause of action.'6 The
court noted the similarity of the activity of defendants here with
that involved in the much discussed case of Ratliff v. Cooper
Laboratories, Inc. ' 7 The significant difference, which supports the
finding of jurisdiction in this case, was that the plaintiff was a
citizen of South Carolina and the state thus had a substantial
paternal interest in the controversy. In Ratliff the plaintiff had
no interest in a South Carolina forum except the state's relatively
long statute of limitation.
The court's analysis in Walworth illustrates what seems to
be the major failing of the Triplett decision. In both cases juris-
diction was asserted under section 10-424 which provides for the
imposition of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations
found to be transacting business within the state. In Triplett the
court limited its inquiry to those traditional factors which tended
to establish that Wade was doing business in the state, and the
resulting decision is somewhat less than satisfying. Had the court
proceeded to analyze other factors such as the nature of the
various interests involved, a much stronger case could have been
made for requiring Wade to defend the action in South Carolina. 8
In two federal district court cases dealing with the reenacted
version of the long-arm statute the principal issue was whether
15. Id. at 301.
16. Id. at 299-300.
17. 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971). For in depth discussion of this case see Conflict of
Laws Symposium, 25 S.C.L. REv. 169 (1973).
18. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969). The court in Buckeye emphasized "purposeful" activity of the defendent in
availing itself of economic benefit in California. Then the court examined the interests of
the plaintiff in bringing suit in the state of the state in protecting its citizens and of justice
generally in finding a convenient forum. The system of analysis is logical and convincing.
1974]
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the statute could be applied retroactively.' 9 In Segars v. Gomez2
and Howard v. Allen 21 South Carolina plaintiffs served process on
out-of-state defendants for acts which occurred before the reen-
actment of the long-arm statute. Although reenactment cured
the South Carolina constitutional defect it was still unclear whe-
ther the effective date of the statute was 1968 or 1972. Defendants
in both cases alleged that retroactive application of the statute
would be violative of procedural due process. The district courts
applied the three criteria laid down in Southern Machinery Co.
v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.21 for determining the outer limits of
in personam jurisdiction based upon a single act:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence
in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from
the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defen-
dant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a
substantial enough connection with the forum state to make
the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.2
The records demonstrated the first and second requisites and the
courts noted that the interest of the State of South Carolina in
providing a forum to its citizens and the likelihood that the ma-
jority of witnesses were located within the state made the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendants reasonable and in accord with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Although
decisions of federal courts interpreting South Carolina law with-
out the benefit of prior South Carolina Supreme Court decisions
are not dispositive, at least one circuit court judge" has followed
the district court decisions approving the retroactive application
of the reenacted statute.
The defect of the original statute under the South Carolina
Constitution 5 was that the title of the Uniform Commercial Code
19. See generally Green v. Rock Hill, 149 S.C. 234, 147 S.E. 346 (1929); 62 AM. JuR.
2d Process § 80 (1972); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 421 (1956); 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 414 (1953).
20, 360 F. Supp. 50 (D.S.C. 1972).
21. 368 F. Supp. 310 (D.S.C. 1973), afl'd, 487 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974).
22. 401 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1968).
23. Id. at 381.
24. Thompson v. Hofman (C.P. Aiken County, Aug. 1, 1973), appeal docketed, No.
7442, S.C. Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1974. Judge Julius B. Ness decided the case in the circuit
court before he was appointed to the supreme court.
25. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 17, provides: "One Subject. Every Act or resolution having
the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
[Vol. 26
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gave no indication that it included a non-commercial long-arm
provision. The reenacted version may serve the purpose of giving
unconditional notice of the provisions therein and also remove
doubt that the courts might have had regarding legislative aware-
ness of the import of the act when first passed. 6
In Clark v. Babbitt Brothers, Inc.27 a South Carolina plaintiff
brought suit against a Wisconsin firm to recover damages result-
ing from a collision in Kentucky. The accident occurred two
months after defendant had ceased operations in South Carolina.
Under the Federal Motor Carrier Act, a carrier is required to
designate an agent for service of process in each state where it
operates, and plaintiff attempted service on the South Carolina
agent. The supreme court upheld dismissal of the service because
the cause of action arose in Kentucky and defendant had ceased
doing business in South Carolina. Jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations, the court said, is a question of state law, and in the
absence of a state provision for such jurisdiction, it cannot be
conferred on state courts by the federal statute. 9
Jurisdictional questions also arose in two divorce-related ac-
tions during the past year. Everhart v. Everhart" involved the
issue of whether a trial court retained in personam jurisdiction
over the parties after granting the divorce and awarding alimony
and support payments to the wife. At the time of the divorce and
the subsequent enforcement proceeding, the husband was a Geor-
gia resident. The wife instituted action to enforce payments and
served him personally in Georgia. The husband appeared spe-
cially to contest jurisdiction. The court stated, however, that "an
application to enforce the alimony and support provisions of a
support decree is not an independent proceeding nor the comm-
encement of a new action, ' '31 and ruled that jurisdiction continues
whether or not it was specifically retained in the decree.3 2 Justice
Bussey, concurring in the result, took issue with this last position
26. The decision in Thompson v. Hofman is currently on appeal to the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court. Both the constitutionality of the statute and its retroactivity are
attacked by the appellant. The question is thereby raised whether the reenactment did
cure the constitutional defect.
27. 260 S.C. 378, 196 S.E.2d 120 (1973).
28. 49 U.S.C.A. § 321(c) (1973).
29. 260 S.C. at 381, 196 S.E.2d at 121.
30. 200 S.E.2d 87 (S.C. 1973).
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stating that, since the decree here did expressly retain jurisdic-
tion, the latter issue was simply not before the court.
33
In Cannon v. Cannon,34 a divorce action, the court upheld
personal service on an out-of-state wife in lieu of service by publi-
cation, as permitted by South Carolina Code sections 20-107 and
10-451 to 454. In the same action, the wife challenged the granting
of custody of the children during pendency of the main action
citing May v. Anderson35 to support her position. The court up-
held the trial court by distinguishing the present case from May
because the children were physically present in South Carolina
when the action was commenced by the father. Physical presence,
the court decided, confers jurisdiction to determine the issue of
custody.:"
In two other actions, the supreme court also reviewed deci-
sions involving jurisdictional questions. State v. Dickert 7 in-
volved a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. The
court reversed a circuit court order granting a new trial and re-
straining the South Carolina Highway Department from sus-
pending the defendant's driving license. The defendant had been
convicted in magistrate's court and had failed to move for a new
trial or to appeal to the court of general sessions as permitted by
statute.' Jurisdiction of the circuit court over decisions of the
magistrate is appellate only.39 In Bourne v. Graham the court,
construing the pertinent code section," declared that the jurisdic-
tion of the municipal court of North Charleston over criminal acts
33. Id. at 89. Justice Bussey expressed doubt that the law on this point was as settled
as the majority indicated but did not document his search of the law. The majority,
however, cites convincing commentary and case law. Id. at 88. The rule seems necessary
to give the court's decree continuing effect.
34. 260 S.C. 204, 195 S.E.2d 176 (1973).
35. 245 U.S. 528 (1952). In May a Wisconsin couple separated, and the wife went to
Ohio with the children. The husband filed for divorce and custody in Wisconsin state
courts and was granted both. He succeeded in bringing the children back to Wisconsin,
but when they did not return from a visit with the mother, he sought to have them
returned by a habeas corpus proceeding in Ohio courts. The Wisconsin decree was given
credit by the Ohio courts, but the United States Supreme Court subsequently overturned
the decision saying that custody was a personal right and could not be decided by a court
lacking in personam jurisdiction of the parties. Neither the wife nor children were present
at the divorce action in Wisconsin.
36. 260 S.C. at 208, 195 S.E.2d at 178.
37. 260 S.C. 490, 197 S.E.2d 89 (1973).
38. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-142,-43 (1962) (new trial) and §§ 7-101,-02 (1962)
(appeal).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-14, -101 et seq. (1962).
40. 260 S.C. 554, 197 S.E.2d 674 (1973).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1002 et seq. (1962).
[Vol. 26294
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commited within its boundaries is concurrent with that of the
county magistrate courts which were in existence prior to incorpo-
ration of the city.
B. Venue
In two cases the supreme court reaffirmed its well-
established policy that rulings on motions for change of venue will
not be disturbed absent a clear showing that the trial judge
abused his discretion.4 2 In Jackson v. H. & S. Oil Co.," the court
acknowledged the substantial right of a corporation to be sued in
its county of residence. The court however, upheld denial of de-
fendant's motion to change venue from Berkeley County, where
the accident occurred. Under the South Carolina Code, a corpo-
rate defendant may be tried in any county in which it owns prop-
erty and transacts business," and the facts supported a finding
that the defendant was so connected with Berkeley County.
Livingston v. Central Refrigeration Co., Inc.45 involved a situation
in which the defendant, a Spartanburg corporation, was first
granted a change of venue from Berkeley County on the grounds
that it had no agent or place of business there, and plaintiff then
moved to change venue back to Berkeley County for the conveni-
ence of witnesses and the ends of justice. The court ruled that the
record supported the sound discretion of the trial judge in allow-
ing plaintiff's motion.
C. Statute of Limitations
The case of Hickman v. Fincher" provides comment on the
value of alleging alternative means of relief at the pleadings stage.
The plaintiff, claiming racial discrimination in the sale of a
- house, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and money dam-
ages under both the Fair Housing Act of 196811 and title 42, sec-
tion 1982 of the United States Code. 8 Defendant moved to dis-
miss on the ground that suit was not brought within the statutory
42. Dimery v. Bloom, 245 S.C. 367, 140 S.E.2d 600 (1965).
43. 199 S.E.2d 71 (S.C. 1973).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-421 (1962).
45. 261 S.C. 147, 198 S.E.2d 799 (1973).
46. 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973).
47. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3604, 3696 (1973).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (1973) reads as follows: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
1974]
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time limit as set forth in the Fair Housing Act. 9 The district
court, interpreting that section properly, dismissed the action.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that, although the action
was not maintainable under the Fair Housing Act, it could still
stand under section 1982. Citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,"
the court explained that the Fair Housing Act was not intended
to alter possible actions under section 1982. The statute of limita-
tions to be applied under section 1982 is that of the state statute
which is expressly, or most nearly, applicable to the type of claim
asserted.5 ' Thus the court held the plaintiff's case was not barred
because the minimum statutory limit in South Carolina for any
cause of action is one year.
5 2
D. Abstention by Federal Courts
Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,53 fed-
eral courts must apply the substantive law of the states. In situa-
tions where the question involves the interpretation of a state
statute, some courts have chosen to hold the question in abeyance
if state law is unclear. Thus, although the federal action is not
dismissed, the doors to the federal forum are effectively closed
until the matter has been settled. The district court re-examined
and applied the fourth circuit position on abstention in Louthian
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.54 The plaintiff, in a previous action,
had been granted a verdict against the unidentified driver of a
hit-and-run vehicle and gought to recover in this action against
defendant insurance company under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision of his policy. The statute involved had not been construed
by the state supreme court with regard to the specific question
involved.5 There was, however, an appeal pending before that
court in a companion case.56 Analyzing the pertinent Fourth Cir-
49. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970), the limit is within 180 days of the last act of
discrimination.
50. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
51. 483 F.2d at 857.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-127, -142, -143, -147, and -148 (1962).
53. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. 357 F. Supp, 894 (D.S.C. 1973).
55. S,C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Cum. Supp. 1971). For a discussion of factual is-
sues, see Survey of Insurance, note 39, supra and accompanying text.
56. Louthian and the driver of the car, Spaulding, brought separate actions in
Charleston County courts against the driver of another auto in addition to the unknown
hit-and-run driver. Both won recoveries against the unknown driver, and Louthian chose
the federal district court, Spaulding the state court, to proceed against defendant insur-




Hipp and Peterson: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
cuit opinions, 57 the court concluded that when a state constitu-
tional question is not involved, the abstention doctrine should not
be used to avoid difficult questions of substantive law. The court
reasoned that to abstain would, in effect, limit litigants in their
opportunity to have their rights asserted in federal rather than
state courts, contrary to the express congressional policy in pro-
viding for diversity jurisdiction. This result might not obtain in
other federal circuits where the abstention doctrine is still used
to avoid difficult questions of substantive law.1
8
H. DISCOvERY
In Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retordeire de Chavanoz 9
the Federal District Court of South Carolina considered the nar-
row issue of whether an "attorney's work product privilege termi-
nates with the termination of the litigation toward which the
attorney's efforts were directed."6 This issue was presented to the
district court in the context of a multi-district patent and anti-
trust action. The plaintiffs in the action (hereinafter referred to
as Throwsters) were seeking production of six hundred eighty-
three documents for inspection to determine the defendant's prior
knowledge of the patents in issue. 6' The defendants, Moulinage
et Retorderie de Chavanoz (hereinafter referred to as Chavanoz),
were withholding some of the documents on the contention that
they were prepared by and for counsel in earlier litigation and,
therefore, were protected as work product under Rule 26(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 2 Throwsters, answering the
In another aspect of the case, the district court did not consider itself bound (under
Erie) by the unreported lower court decision in the Spaulding suit on the question of state
law, citing 1 BARRON & HOLTZHOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8 (Wright rev.
1960).
57. A.F.A. Distrib. Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1973), Martin
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1967), Wohl v. Keene, 476 F.2d
171 (4th Cir. 1973).
58. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 998-
1009 (2d ed. 1973).
59. 61 F.R.D. 127 (D.S.C. 1973), labeled Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc. in
the official reporter.
60. Id. at 135.
61. Id. at 129.
62. Id. at 130. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) provides:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) (4) of
this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things other-
wise discoverable under subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer,
1974]
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defendants' contention, alleged that the work product exemption
from discovery does not extend beyond the termination of the
litigation for which it was prepared. 3
The district court held that
(1) when a case in litigation finally is terminated; (2) by either
decision of the court or by settlement among the parties; (3) the
work product privilege is also terminated; and (4) the work
product of attorneys in prior litigation is therefore subject to
discovery in subsequent litigation."
In terminating the attorney-work product privilege, the court dis-
tinguished two cases heavily relied upon by Chavanoz. Chavanoz
cited Insurance Co. of North America v. Union Carbide Corp. 5
as holding that the purpose of the work product privilege was
equally applicable to present and future litigation."6 The district
court found Union Carbide inapplicable because the documents
therein were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Accord-
ingly, the district court concluded that any language in Union
Carbide concerning work product was merely dictum.6" Consider-
ing Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Co.,6" the district court
found that even though the court in Republic Gear made broad
statements about the purpose of the work product rule, it actually
based its holding on the fact that the clients from the initial
litigation remained subject to suit.69 The court then cited United
States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co.," Thompson v. Hoitsma,1 and
Transmirra Products Corp. v. Monsanto Chemical Co.72 as cases
supporting the termination of the work product privilege upon
or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party concerning the litigation.
63. 61 F.R.D. 131.
64. Id. at 135.
65. 35 F.R.D. 520 (D. Colo. 1964).
66. 61 F.R.D. at 132-33.
67. Id. at 133.
68. 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967).
69. 61 F.R.D. at 134.
70. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
71. 19 F.R.D. 112 (D.N.J. 1956).
72. 26 F.R.D. 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
[Vol. 26
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termination of the litigation for which the work product was pre-
pared. Thus, on the weight of this authority, the court ruled that
the documents held by Chavanoz were not protected as work
product. Recognizing, however, the determination of the scope of
the work product privilege under rule 26(b) (3) to be a "controlling
question of law," the district court encouraged Chavanoz to ap-
peal its interlocutory decision and certified the order to the court
of appeals in accordance with title 28, section 1292(b) of the
United States Code.
73
In reversing and remanding the decision of the district court,
the court of appeals took a different approach to the issue. Rather
than basing its decision on a weighing of inconsistent prior case
law, the court looked to the history of rule 26(b) (3) to determine
its purpose. 4 The court found the rule was simply a codification
of Hickman v. Taylor,7 5 and turned to that decision for its an-
swer.76 The circuit court felt the answer was provided by the
Supreme Court in Hickman when the Court stated:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwrit-
ten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be
his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inev-
itably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the prepara-
tion of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would
be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause
of justice would be poorly served.
77
The court of appeals reasoned that this rationale was no "less
applicable to a case which has been closed than to one which is
still being contested," because the Hickman rationale was not
73. 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973). 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeal-
able under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a control-
ling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after
the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal here-
under shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge
or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
74. 487 F.2d at 481-82.
75. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
76. 487 F.2d at 482, quoting 8 C. WRIGHT and A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, 193 (1969).
77. Id., quoting 329 U.S. at 511.
1974]
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss2/10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw [Vol. 26
based in any way upon "the rights or posture of the litigants vis-
a-vis each other." ' Following this reasoning, the court of appeals
held that the work product privilege extended beyond the litiga-
tion for which the work product was prepared.
An analysis of these two decisions shows two different treat-
ments of the same issue. In view of the inconsistent decisions in
this area, the court of appeals took the preferred approach. The
authority-weighing approach of the district court accomplished
little more than allowing the court to conclude that a few more
cases held one way rather than the other. The approach of the
court of appeals, on the other hand, was to examine the policy
underlying the rule, determine its purpose, and decide the issue
in a way that best reflected that purpose. Following the latter
method the court of appeals came to the correct result.79 There
remains, however, a great deal of confusion on this narrow, but
important, issue of the work product privilege because of the
many diverse decisions. This uncertainty will remain until the
United States Supreme Court rules on this matter.
Ill. CONDUCT OF TRIAL
A. Pleading
In South Carolina the established rule of law is that al-
though a demurrer admits the well-pleaded facts of a complaint,
it does not admit any conclusion of law pleaded therein.' In
Stroud v. Riddle' the plaintiffs alleged that although taxable
property within School District No. 520 had a uniform millage
imposed for educational purposes, the property was not being
78. Id. at 483. This conclusion follows the determination that the work product privi-
lege is for the protection of attorneys and the legal system, and does not have any direct
relationship to the rights of individual litigants.
79. As the court pointed out, this decision did not unjustly limit discovery because
the work product privilege is only a qualified one. That is, a party may discover documents
despite their being work product upon a showing that the information is essential to a fair
trial and cannot be obtained in any other manner without undue hardship. [Rule
26(b)(3)]. Balancing the interest of the party seeking the documents against the interest
of the attorney involved and the legal profession in light of the limited scope of the work
product privilege, shows the fairness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Since Rule
26(b)(3) would clearly allow the discovery if the party could show a great need for such,
the interest of the party is protected by the rule itself; therefore, this causes the balance
to tip in favor of the attorney, who prepared the work product, and the legal profession as
a whole.
80. Costas v. Florence Printing Co., 237 S.C. 655, 118 S.E.2d 696 (1961).
81. 260 S.C. 99, 194 S.E.2d at 236.
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valued or assessed uniformly in the three counties comprising the
district.12 Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that they were being
denied equal protection under the law and prayed that the defen-
dants be restrained from assessing and valuing property in the
school district other than on a uniform basis. The trial judge
granted defendant's demurrer on the ground that the complaint
stated only a conclusion of law."3 The supreme court reversed by
holding that the complaint pleaded ultimate facts, not conclu-
sions of law.84 To reach this result the court stated that even
though the lines of distinction between ultimate facts, conclu-
sions of law, and evidentiary facts are "faint and often disputed,"
the distinction can be characterized as follows:
The ultimate facts required to be stated in a pleading are those
which the evidence upon the trial will prove, and not the evi-
dence which will be required to prove those facts. Conclusions
of law describe a legal status, condition, or legal offense. 5
Accordingly, the court held the complaint was not demurrable.88
In Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. v. Perry,87 respondent had
demurred to appellant's malicious prosecution counterclaim
upon the ground that "the subject of this counterclaim was an
alleged tort or torts which did not arise out of the contract or
transaction set forth in the complaints, nor was it connected with
the subject matter of the action." 8 This demurrer was sustained
by the lower court on statutory grounds under section 10-703(1)
of the South Carolina Code. 9 Appellant did not take an exception
to that ruling but was granted permission by the circuit court to
file an amended answer and counterclaim. After appellant had
filed his amended pleadings, respondent again demurred.
82. Id. at 101, 194 S.E.2d at 236.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 103-04, 194 S.E.2d at 237.
85. Id. (footnotes omitted).
86. In view of the well-established principle that pleadings attacked by demurrer
should be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, Athanas v. City of Spartanburg, 196
S.C. 19, 12 S.E.2d 39 (1940), it seems that the court correctly analyzed this close distinc-
tion between ultimate facts and conclusions of law and thereby reached the correct deci-
sion.
87. 201 S.E.2d 245 (S.C. 1973).
88. Id. at 246-47.
89. Id. at 247. Section 10-703(1) of the South Carolina Code specifically limits the
causes of action assertable on counterclaim in a contract action to those actions "arising
out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the
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Upon finding that appellant's amended pleadings set out essen-
tially the same cause of action as his original counterclaim, the
circuit court sustained the second demurrer." In affirming the
circuit court's ruling on the second demurrer, the supreme court
held that the lower court's decision to sustain the original demur-
rer had become the law of the case and thus was dispositive of
the second demurrer also.
The correctness of the Cooper Tire reasoning is clear when it
is recognized that the appellant used an amended pleading incor-
rectly. If the appellant felt that the circuit court had erred when
it sustained the respondent's initial demurrer to the malicious
prosecution counterclaim, he should have sought a review of that
ruling through the usual appellate process. Since he failed to
follow that procedure and instead sought to amend his pleadings,
the appellant in essence had admitted to the circuit court that
he agreed with its initial interpretation of section 10-703(1) as it
was applied to his counterclaim. Because the appellant's
amended counterclaim set out the same cause of action as his
original counterclaim, it is logical that the circuit court's ruling
on the first counterclaim and demurrer should also control the
second. In addition, the appellant failed to take an exception to
the circuit court's finding that his amended pleadings were the
same as the original ones, and consequently he was unable to
contest that finding on appeal.2
The supreme court, in Revis v. Martin,13 reaffirmed its posi-
tion of refusing to allow cases presenting issues of novel impres-
sion to be decided on demurrer. This rule was first announced in
1967, when the supreme court, in Springfield v. Williams
Plumbing & Supply Co.,9" overruled a demurrer because the
plaintiff's pleadings presented questions of novel impression in a
products liability case. The court reasoned that justice required
the case to be decided on the merits with all the evidence before
the court rather than on demurrer. 5 In Revis the court found the
question of whether the father of an illegitimate child has any
visitation rights to be a question of novel impression. The su-
preme court, affirming the lower court, followed Springfield and
concluded that such a question should not be decided on
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 260 S.C. 347, 195 S.E.2d 715 (1973).
94. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
95. Id. at 139, 153 S.E.2d at 187.
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demurrer2 Thus, the Revis case indicates that the principle an-
nounced in Springfield has become an established rule of law in
South Carolina."
B. Joinder of Parties
The issue of joinder of parties in a class action suit was pre-
sented in Long v. Seabrook.18 Plaintiff brought a class action on
behalf of other taxpayers of Charleston County seeking equitable
relief and damages in tort9 against the county assessment control
board and other county officials. The trial court ruled that plain-
tiff could not maintain a class action damage suit "on the facts
alleged."' ° The supreme court noted that essentially all the equi-
table relief sought had been granted in the trial court's order "for
the purpose of discovery only and . . . not on adjudication of his
case on the merits. . . ."I" In its per curiam opinion the supreme
court upheld the lower court's ruling on the tort class action citing
Hellams v. Switzer02 and Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co.,'13 cases
finding joinder of parties improper unless plaintiffs had suffered
"joint" injuries resulting in damages in solido.
It might be asked how Ryder and Hellams, cases concerned
with permissive joinder, could affect class actions. In South Caro-
96. 260 S.C. at 349, 195 S.E.2d at 715-16.
97. See also Vaden v. College Heights Subdivision, 201 S.E.2d 113 (S.C. 1973);
Twitty v. Key Life Insurance Co., 260 S.C. 573, 197 S.E.2d 656 (1973) (concurring and
dissenting opinion); Gantt v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 254 S.C. 112, 173 S.E.2d 658
(1970); and Flowers v. Oakdale Realty and Water Corp., 253 S.C. 522, 171 S.E.2d 863
(1970).
98. 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973).
99. The complaint sought an order requiring defendants to provide a copy of tax
assessment rolls and other pertinent documents and prayed for damages because of defen-
dant's bad faith refusal in not allowing plaintiff to duplicate tax rolls. Id. at 565-66, 197
S.E.2d at 660-61.
100. Although the trial court could not justify a class action on the facts alleged, the
supreme court opinion can be read quite broadly to preclude tort actions.
101. Id. at 567, 197 S.E.2d at 661. As noted the supreme court was concerned exclu-
sively with the tort claim. If both equitable tort claims had been before the court, plaintiff
might have argued that the main claim was equitable and only incidentally for damages
-employing an ancillary concept to allow the action to continue.
Plaintiff might also have argued that in equity, once the court has taken jurisdiction
over a matter properly before it, there will be an adjudication of the entire matter even
to the extent of awarding damages. See Cloyes v. Middleburg Elec. Co., 80 Vt. 109, 66
A. 1039 (1907).
102. 24 S.C. 39 (1885).
103. 121 S.C. 72, 113 S.E. 474 (1922).
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lina several old class action cases '04 have cited with approval sec-
tion 392 of Pomeroy's Code Remedies:
The parties thus represented by the plaintiff or defendant
may not be in privity with each other, but there must be some
bond of connection which unites them all with the question at
issue in the action.The test would be to suppose that an action
in which all of the numerous persons were actually made plain-
tiffs or defendants, and if it could be maintained in that form,
then one might sue or be sued on behalf of the others; but if such
actual joinder would be improper, then the suit by or against
one as a representative would be improper, notwithstanding the
permission contained in this section.' 5
Quite simply, the test of maintenance of class actions is whether
joinder of all parties would be allowed.' 0 Value of the permissive
joinder to parties representing classes depends entirely on the
liberality of permissive joinder. 0 In South Carolina, Hellams and
Ryder are not liberal expressions of joinder. Hellams involved a
joint action by individual property owners whose land was dam-
aged by defendant's dam. In Ryder a husband and wife sued for
wrongful ejectment from a hotel by its manager. The courts re-
jected both suits, employing essentially the following reasoning:
The Code of Procedure [section 10-202] requires that the cause
of action joined in the same complaint "must affect all parties
to the action." Neither has a legal interest in the pecuniary
recovery of the other, and in contemplation of law there can be
no joint and common damage to both resulting from a wrong
which gives rise to separate and distinct rights personal to
each. 0
The court in Long could have chosen to follow the old class action
cases adopting the Pomeroy rationale or simply to ignore them,
and reject the permissive joinder test, keeping in mind the basic
policies to be served by the class action device. Long, however,
reaffirmed the concept of "joint injuries,"and thus endorsed an
antiquated and conceptually unsound doctrine repudiated by the
104. Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C. 29, 65 S.E. 953 (1909); Faber v. Faber, 76 S.C. 156,
56 S.E. 677 (1907); Stemmerman v. Lilienthal, 54 S.C. 440, 32 S.E. 535 (1899).
105. J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 392 (4th ed. 1904).
106. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407 (1969).
107. For very liberal uses of the permissive joinder concept see Adams v. Albany, 124
Cal. App. 2d 639, 269 P.2d 142 (1954) and Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682
(1929).
108. 121 S.C. at 75, 113 S.E. at 475.
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amended version of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." 9 Snyder v. Harris10 and Zahn v. International Paper
Co."' have effectively closed federal courts to diversity consumer
class actions for damages in which individual claims fall below
the jurisdictional amount. Read broadly, Long can be interpreted
as also closing South Carolina courts to consumer class actions
for damages and effectively foreclosing the development of con-
sumer actions within the state."1
2
C. Motion for Continuance
It is well-established in South Carolina that a motion for a
continuance, which is provided for in Rule 27 of the Circuit Court
Rules,"3 is subject to the discretion of the trial judge. Only upon
a showing of abuse of discretion is his disposition of such a motion
reversible."' The supreme court's continued reliance on this rule
is evidenced by State v. Marshall.", The court unanimously af-
firmed the trial judge's denial of a continuance to a defendant
indicted for murder, even though defendant received counsel only
nineteen days before the trial."6 Even though the rule of law
109. See Advisory Committee notes FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
110. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
111. 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973).
112. For an unreported decision denying class status to a usury action see Howell v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., Court of Common Pleas, Florence County (1968).
113. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 27, provides as follows:
No motion for the postponement of trial beyond the term, either in the Common
Pleas or General Sessions, shall be granted, on account of the absence of a
witness, without the oath of the party, his counsel or agent, to the following
effect, to wit: That the testimony of the witness is material to the support of
the action of defense party moving; that the motion is not intended for delay;
but is made solely because he cannot go safely to trial without such testimony;
that he has made use of due diligence to procure the testimony of the witness
or of such other circumstances as will satisfy the Court that his motion is not
intended for delay. In all such cases where a writ of subpoena has been issued,
the original shall be produced, with proof of service, or the reason why not served
endorsed thereon, or attached thereto; or, if lost, the same proof shall be offered,
with additional proof of the loss of the original subpoena.
A party applying for such postponement on account of the absence of a
witness shall set forth under oath in addition to the foregoing matter what fact
or facts he believes the witness if present would testify to, and the grounds of
such belief.
114. Fitch v. State, 2 Nott & McCord 558 (S.C. 1820).
115. 260 S.C. 323, 195 S.E.2d 709 (1973).
116. The relevant facts of this case were stated as follows:
Appellant was arrested and charged with the crime on February 14, 1970.
Counsel was appointed to represent him on February 20, 1970, and an inquest
was held on February 23d . . . . [Tihe trial began about March 11, 1970,
1974]
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applied in Marshall is undisputed, the court's application of this
rule seems very harsh in light of the factual situation. If the denial
of the motion for continuance in this case was not an abuse of
discretion by the trial judge, it is difficult to conceive of a situa-
tion in which there could be an abuse of discretion."7
In Johnson v. State' 8 the supreme court held that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied defense counsel
the opportunity to prepare the affidavits for a motion of continu-
ance as required by Rule 27. The court placed great emphasis on
its own finding that the defendant had "show(n) a complete lack
of diligence . .. in failing to have his witnesses in court or in
discovering that they were unavailable in time to have made
appropriate motions before commencement of the trial.""' 9 It
seems, therefore, that unless the defendant makes his motion
before the commencement of the trial or can otherwise convince
the court that he has acted with due diligence, his chances for a
reversal of a trial judge's decision to overrule his motion for a
continuance are slight.
D. Jury Instructions
It is established in South Carolina that an instruction on the
law of self-defense should be given to the jury in a case when any
evidence has been presented from which it might reasonably be
inferred that the defendant's actions were justified by self-
defense.'20 The supreme court reaffirmed this principle in State
v. Taylor'2' by reversing and remanding the defendant's convic-
tion of manslaughter. The trial judge had refused to instruct the
jury on self-defense after the jury had requested such instruction.
The court held that despite the absence of a plea of self-defense,
which was about twenty-five days after the arrest of the appellant and nineteen
days after the appointment of counsel.
Of the witnesses who were not present at the trial and whose presence ap-
pellant desired, the name of one and the whereabouts of two others were un-
known; and a third, who fired his pistol and was allegedly struck by a bullet at
the time of the killing in question, was either in, or on his way home from, Hot
Springs, Arkansas. Id. at 326, 195 S.E.2d at 710.
117. For three additional decisions by the supreme court following this rule in the last
year, see State v. Holland, 201 S.E.2d 118 (S.C. 1973); State v. Owens, 260 S.C. 79, 194
S.E.2d 246 (1973); State v. Butler, 200 S.E.2d 70 (S.C. 1973).
118. 200 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1973).
119. Id. at 82. See also State v. Butler, 200 S.E.2d 70 (S.C. 1973).
120. State v. Turner, 63 S.C. 548, 41 S.E. 778 (1902). See 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 375
(1944); 40 AM. JuR. 2d Homicide § 521 (1969).
121. 200 S.E.2d 387 (S.C. 1973).
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the jury should be charged on the law whenever evidence has been
introduced from which "it can be reasonably inferred that the
accused inflicted the mortal wound but justifiably did so in self-
defense .... ,122
In State v. Smalls,'23 the supreme court upheld the necessity
for trial courts to instruct juries that evidence of prior criminal
convictions is limited to impeachment of the accused as a wit-
ness. It is well-settled in South Carolina that when an accused
becomes a witness in his own trial, he is subjected to the same
duties and liabilities as other witnesses. Therefore, evidence of
prior convictions involving moral turpitude may be introduced for
the purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness.2'4 If such
evidence is introduced, the court must instruct the jury that such
evidence can be considered only for the limited purpose of deter-
mining credibility.125 In Smalls, this issue was complicated to
some extent by the fact that defense counsel, anticipating the
prosecutor's introduction of such evidence, introduced the defen-
dant's prior criminal record on direct examination. The trial
judge refused to give the limiting instruction, because the evi-
dence was introduced by the defense. On appeal, the supreme
court considered whether this factual difference had any effect on
the trial judge's duty to give the limiting instruction to the jury.
In reversing the lower court's decision and remanding the case for
a new trial, the supreme court applied a common-sense analysis,
and reached the conclusion that the defendant did have a right,
upon request, to have the judge instruct the jury on this evidence.
The judge's failure to do so constituted prejudicial error.' 2 Thus,
the supreme court has approved the introduction of a defendant's
122. Id. at 388.
123. 260 S.C. 44, 194 S.E.2d 188 (1973).
124. State v. Gilbert, 196 S.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 451 (1941); State v. Milling, 247 S.C.
52, 145 S.E.2d 422 (1965). It should be noted that not all jurisdictions limit the permissible
evidence of past crimes to those involving moral turpitude, but this does seem to be the
general rule of evidence followed by the courts in South Carolina. J. DREHER, A GuIE TO
EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUM CAROLINA 18-19 (1967).
125. C. MCCORMICK, EVIENCE § 59 (1972).
126. The court said:
There is nothing to indicate that the present testimony was introducted by
appellant for any purpose other than to gain such favorable reaction as might
arise from a frank disclosure of damaging testimony, which the prosecution had
the right to later introduce. The testimony, as introduced, related solely to the
issue of credibility and appellant, upon request, had the right to have it so
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prior criminal record by his own counsel when counsel feels it is
a wise tactical move.
. New Trial
In Brewer v. South Carolina State Highway Dept.,127 the
Richland County Court enjoined the highway department from
suspending Brewer's driver's license pending the outcome of a
new trial. Earlier Brewer had been convicted of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In
reviewing the highway department's appeal of the injunction, the
supreme court considered two issues concerning new trials. First
the court considered the timeliness of Brewer's motion for a new
trial. The highway department contended that Brewer failed to
make his motion for a new trial within five days of his conviction
as required by section 43-143 of the South Carolina Code. 28 In the
magistrate's court Brewer had been tried and convicted in
absentia. Neither Brewer nor his attorney had received prior no-
tice of the trial. The first notice Brewer received of his conviction
was approximately twenty-three days later, when he was notified
by the highway department that his license was suspended. One
day later the magistrate granted Brewer a new trial upon the
motion of his attorney. The supreme court followed the principle
established in O'Rouke v. Atlantic Paint Co.' - and held Brewer's
motion to be timely, because the time period in which a party has
to move for a new trial does not begin to run until he has notice
of the trial. 130
Secondly, the highway department contended that the
granting of the new trial should not support an injunction re-
straining it from suspending Brewer's license pending the out-
127. 261 S.C. 52, 198 S.E.2d 256 (1973).
128. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-143 (1962) provides: "No motion for a new trial shall be
heard unless made within five days from the rendering of the judgment."
129. 91 S.C. 399, 74 S.E. 930 (1912). O'Rouke held as follows:
The general law, as well as the statute, contemplate that a party shall have
notice before his rights are cut off. . . the time to move for a new trial or appeal
in a case like this does not begin to run until the party affected by the judgment
has had notice of it. Id. at 402, 74 S.E. at 931.
It should be noted that a distinction could have been made between O'Rouke and the
present case on the grounds of a difference in the statutory language. The code provision
applied in Brewer, section 43-143 of the 1962 South Carolina Code, makes no mention of
notice whereas O'Rouke relied on section 359 of the 1902 Code of Civil Procedure, which
gave the moving party five days "after personal notice of the judgment, to serve his notice
of appeal . .. ."
130, 261 S.C. at 56, 198 S.E.2d at 257.
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come of the new trial. The supreme court, ruling that the
injunction was properly issued by the county court, based its
decision on the distinction between a pending appeal and a pend-
ing new trial. "' While noting that "an appeal from a conviction
for violation of Section 46-343 of the Code did not preclude the
suspension of the license of the person so convicted.. ,",3 the
court ruled that the granting of a new trial placed Brewer in the
same position as if there had been no trial.'33 Thus, there being




In Bohumir Kryl Symphony Band v. Allen University,' the
supreme court established the rule that a judgment non obstante
veredicto can be rendered only when the trial court should have
directed a verdict during the trial for the moving party. Further,
a judgment non obstante veredicto must be based upon the
grounds set out in the motion for directed verdict. This general
rule has been followed in South Carolina, 136 and the supreme
court remained consistent in Government Employment Insur-
ance Co. v. Mackey. 37 Following the Bohumir line of decisions,
the supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of Mackey's
motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. 38 He failed to set
forth his contentions in his earlier motion for directed verdict.' 39
131. Id. at 56-57, 198 S.E.2d at 258.
132. Id., citing Parker v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382
(1953).
133. The court was following the rule established in State v. Squires, 248 S.C. 239,
149 S.E.2d 601 (1966).
134. 261 S.C. at 57-58, 198 S.E.2d at 258.
135. 196 S.C. 173, 12 S.E.2d 712 (1940).
136. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilkinson Trucking Co., 243 S.C. 150, 136 S.E.2d 491
(1963); Standard Warehouse Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 222 S.C. 93, 71 S.E.2d
893 (1952). See also S.C. CIR. CT. R. 79, for a general rule concerning motions for judg-
ments non obstante veredicto.
It should be noted that the law on this point varies throughout the jurisdictions, and
it seems that most jurisdictions do not strictly limit motions for judgments non obstante
verdicto to the grounds previously raised on motions for directed verdict. See generally
46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments §§ 123, 130 (1969); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 60 (1947); and
Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 449, 484 (1960).
137. 260 S.C. 306, 195 S.E.2d 830 (1973).
138. "The appellants moved for judgment non obstante veredicto on the ground that
the respondent had failed to prove compliance with Sections 18 and 19 of the Assigned
Risk Plans in that the notice of cancellation did not contain a statement that the insured
had the right to appeal as therein set forth." Id. at 315, 195 S.E.2d at 834.
139. Id. at 316, 195 S.E.2d at 834.
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The defendant in Mclnerny v. Toler"' moved to have a de-
fault judgment against him vacated and the case reopened pur-
suant to section 10-1213 of the Code which provides:
The court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may
be just, at any time within one year after notice thereof relieve
a party from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect and may supply an omission in any proceed-
ing .... 141
Although the defendant admitted receiving the summons and
complaint for the original trial, he contended that his failure to
consult counsel was "excusable neglect" since he thought the
plaintiff had made a mistake.'4 2 The lower court's denial of the
defendant's motion was affirmed on appeal. The supreme court
emphasized that section 10-1213 provides that such a motion is
directed to the discretion of the trial court.' Furthermore, the
court cited Williams v. Ray' for the well-settled rule that a party
seeking relief under section 10-1213 must show that the judgment
against him was caused by his inadvertence, mistake, surprise or
excusable neglect and, secondly, that he had a meritorious de-
fense. Applying this reasoning, the court in McInerny held there
was clearly no abuse of discretion since the record "compels the
conclusion that the appellant failed to meet the first requirement
for relief because his own course of conduct negatives inadvert-
ence, surprise and excusable neglect."'' 4 Thus, the merit of the
appellant's defense was never considered.
IV. POST TRIAL RELIEF
A. Appeal
In Richland County v. Palmetto Cablevision,46 the supreme
court considered the issue of whether exceptions to a trial court
decision, which were not argued under an "appropriately stated
question" in the appellate brief, should be deemed abandoned for
the purpose of appeal. Richland County appealed from a decision
140. 260 S.C. 382, 196 S.E.2d 122 (1973).
141. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1213 (1962).
142. 260 S.C, at 385, 196 S.E.2d at 123.
143. Id. at 386, 196 S.E.2d at 124.
144. 232 S.C. 373, 102 S.E.2d 368 (1958).
145. 260 S.C. at 387, 196 S.E.2d at 124.
146. 199 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 1973).
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by the court of common pleas refusing to enjoin the defendant
from operating and maintaining a cable television system within
the county.'47 The lower court had dismissed the complaint be-
cause the appellant was proceeding under an act which the court
found:
...to be special legislation and unconstitutional in violation
to Article III, Sec. 34 of the South Carolina Constitution. Addi-
tionally, he concluded that said Act was unconstitutional as
being a delegation of legislative power in violation of the South
Carolina Constitution; as impairing the obligation of contracts,
as depriving the respondent of its property without due process
of law and as denying the respondent the equal protection of the
laws, in violation of the applicable provisions of both State and
Federal Constitutions.'
48
Although the appellant excepted to all of these holdings of
unconstitutionality, the only exception argued in the appellant's
brief was the holding that the act was unconstitutional as special
legislation. On appeal, the supreme court, in compliance with a
line of South Carolina cases beginning in 1898,49 held that those
exceptions not expressly argued by the appellant during his ap-
peal would be deemed abandoned.15 Following this analysis, the
court held that the lower court's "holding of unconstitutionality
on grounds other than being special legislation have [sic] be-
come, right or wrong, the law of the case, rendering it virtually
moot whether or not said Act is unconstitutional as special
legislation."' 5 ' This conclusion, while being clearly supported by
South Carolina law, seems to be further supported by the logic
of the situation, since an appellate court should be able to assume
that unless an appellant argues against a decision of the lower
court, he has accepted it.
B. State Post-Conviction Relief
During the past year, the supreme court addressed the gen-
147. In seeking this injunction, the plaintiff relied on Act No. 1083 of the 1972 Acts
of the General Assembly which "amends the 1964 Act establishing the Board of Adminis-
trators (now the County Council) of Richland County and purports to confer upon it the
authority to grant franchise licenses for the operation of cable television service in all areas
of Richland County except the city of Columbia." Id. at 169.
148. Id. at 168-69.
149. Cromer v. Columbia, N. & L. Ry. Co., 52 S.C. 36, 29 S.E. 637 (1898).
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eral issue of whether a defendant had met the requisite proce-
dural requirements to obtain post-conviction relief.'5 2 In Sellers v.
Boone,'53 the court considered the problem of a timely exception.
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act'54 the peti-
tioner sought relief from his prior conviction for the offense df riot.
The petitioner argued that the supreme court's previous affirm-
ance of his conviction violated the double jeopardy clauses of both
state and Federal Constitutions, since he had received a directed
verdict of not guilty in the lower court on the counts charging
"conspiracy to commit riot and inciting persons to riot."'55 The
court recognized this to be a novel approach, but found the con-
tention lacking on two grounds.'56 First, the defendant's claim
was improperly raised for the first time by his application for
post-conviction relief. The court reasoned that any claim of dou-
ble jeopardy available to the defendant on the grounds of the
directed verdict arose at the time the charge of riot was submitted
to the jury. Accordingly, the defendant's failure to raise this dou-
ble jeopardy issue during the trial, during his appeal from the
conviction, or during the period available to petition for rehear-
ing, constituted a failure on his part to raise the issue in a timely
fashion. 57 Secondly, the court found that even if it waived the
defendant's failure to raise the issue properly his claim was with-
out merit.' 8 The court reached this conclusion after determining
that the counts on which the defendant received directed verdicts
constituted separate and distinct crimes from the count on which
he was convicted.'55 Upon establishing this, the court analogized
152. This issue was considered in Sellers v. Boone, 200 S.E.2d 686 (S.C. 1973), and
Johnson v. State, 200 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1973). Sellers is discussed in the text. In Johnson,
the defendant appealed from the lower court's denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief. Johnson alleged that the trial court erred when it denied his counsel an opportunity
to prepare affidavits stipulating the testimony of absent witnesses for publication to the
jury or in support of a motion for continuance. The court, looking to the actual statutory
language involved, held that the appellant had clearly failed to allege any violation of a
constitutional right or any of the other grounds for relief under the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act; therefore, the appellant's avenues for appeal were limited to a
direct review of the lower court's alleged error.
In coming to these conclusions, the court summarily treated the issues, but, in light
of the direct statutory language involved, such treatment was correct.
153. 200 S.E.2d 686 (S.C. 1973).
154. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-601,-12 (Cum. Supp. 1973).




159. Id. at 688-89. The court indulged in a discussion of the history of these respective
charges; a discussion which is beyond the scope of this survey.
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the situation to the dismissal of one or more counts of an indict-
ment and logically concluded that such activity does not amount
to double jeopardy.6 0
C. Federal Habeas Corpus and Section 1983 Actions
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court decided the contro-
versial case of Preiser v. Rodriguez6' in which it held that, in any
action falling within the "core of habeas corpus," the sole federal
remedy available is a writ of habeas corpus.' 2 In Preiser, New
York prison officials had cancelled for disciplinary reasons three
prisoners' good-behavior time credits which would have entitled
the prisoners to release before the expiration of their maximum
sentences.' 3 The prisoners sought restoration of these credits by
bringing separate actions under the 1871 Civil Rights Act,' 4 in
conjunction with habeas corpus actions in federal court.,6 5 The
Supreme Court held that these actions were within the "core of
habeas corpus" which it defined as any action by a state prisoner
challenging the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and
by which he seeks a determination that he is entitled to an imme-
diate or speedier release.'66 Therefore, since the civil rights action
was unavailable to the prisoners'67 and since they had not ex-
hausted all state remedies before filing the writ of habeas cor-
pus,' 6 the prisoners were denied relief.
160. Id. at 689.
161. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). It should be noted that the Preiser decision has been greatly
criticized for its analysis; however, any discussion of the pros and cons of this decision is
beyond the scope of this survey, which will deal with Preiser only to determine whether
the two South Carolina cases correctly applied it. For criticism of the Court's analysis,
see the extensive dissenting opinion; Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of Habeas Corpus": the
Supreme Court and the Limitations on a Prisoner's Right to Sue; Preiser v. Rodriguez. 9
CRIM. L. BULL. Vol. 518 (1973).
162. 411 U.S. at 500.
163. Id. at 476-77.
164. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
165. 411 U.S. at 478, 48-81.
166. Id. at 500.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 493. The exhaustion of state remedies requirement is imposed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) (1970) which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
26
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Since the Preiser decision, the federal district court in South
Carolina has found it directly applicable to two cases. In Curley
v. Bryan"' two state prisoners instituted an action under the
Declaratory Judgment statute'0 and the Civil Rights Act"' seek-
ing their release from custody as well as money damages. They
alleged that law enforcement officials had illegally searched them
and used the fruits of their search in their trial. Addressing first
the plaintiffs' prayer that they be released from custody, the dis-
trict court cited Preiser as authority and held as follows:
Insofar as plaintiffs' Complaint seeks their release from custody,
their sole federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus, with its
attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies, and an
action under the Civil Rights Act will not lie.'72
Since this action sought immediate release and thus fell squarely
within the scope of habeas corpus as described in Preiser," the
district court correctly denied the relief sought because the plain-
tiffs had failed to exhaust available state remedies.
The district court considered the plaintiffs' plea for monetary
damages to be a proper section 1983 civil rights action and pro-
ceeded to examine the validity of the damages claim.' The court
found that the alleged illegal search had never been determined
to be illegal by any court. Rather, the only court to rule on the
search found it to be valid, and the plaintiff had not appealed this
determination to the state supreme court. Citing a Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals memorandum decision,175 the court held that
the plaintiffs were precluded from recovering monetary damages
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the exist-
ence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the prisoner...
169. 362 F. Supp. 48 (D.S.C. 1973).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
172. 362 F. Supp. at 51.
173. 411 U.S. at 487.
174. See 411 U.S. at 506-12 (dissenting opinion). It is interesting to note that Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Preiser, forewarned the Court that the effect of its decision would
be to force prisoners to bring actions for damages.
175. Gatling v. Midgett, No. 14, 863 mem. dec. (4th Cir. 1971). See 362 F. Supp. at
52. Even though the district court recognized that a memorandum decision had no value
as precedent, the court decided that the principle stated in the decision had value and
therefore applied it to the case at law. In Gatling the court ruled on a factual situation
similar to Curley and said:
In this context we think a broad rule of estoppel is appropriate: that a
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under a rule of estoppel.' Since the plaintiffs had not appealed
the state circuit court ruling on the validity of the search, they
were estopped from seeking monetary damages in federal court.
Though the district court did not specifically refer to Preiser
in concluding that this action for monetary damages was a proper
section 1983 action, the majority in Preiser clearly set out that
such an action was proper.'77 Therefore, the district court cor-
rectly applied the Preiser decision. In so doing, it appears that
some of the fears of the dissenting justices in Preiser were well
founded. First, just as those justices predicted," in order to avoid
the exhaustion requirement if the claim is within the core of
habeas corpus, prisoners may add to their petition a claim for
monetary damages. This happened in Curley. Furthermore, the
result of such a petition was exactly as the dissenters expected.
Upon finding the action for damages to be a valid section 1983
action, the district court proceeded to decide the validity of the
specific allegations of the plaintiffs. At the same time, the court
directed the plaintiffs to the state courts for relief sought which
was within the core of habeas corpus in order to meet the exhaus-
tion requirement. Thus, the same specific allegations and ques-
tions of law being decided by the federal court were referred to
the state courts. The extreme inefficiency 7 ' of such a conclusion
is evident. Since the federal court decided the issue of the legality
of the searches and seizures against the plaintiffs, this decision
will necessarily have some effect on a state court that later ad-
dresses the same issue. 8' It seems, therefore, that the Curley
§ 1983 civil action based on a search and seizure held valid in a criminal trial
cannot be maintained so long as the criminal judgment of conviction remains
undisturbed. Federalism, we think, requires such a result. It is difficult to con-
ceive of a more abrasive example of indifference to state judicial process than
to allow a civil action to proceed in a federal court on a fact hypothesis finally
adjudicated and rejected in a presumably valid state criminal proceeding. No.
14, 863 mem. dec. at 2-3.
176. 362 F. Supp. at 52.
177. 411 U.S. at 494.
178. Id. at 506-07 (dissenting opinion).
179. Id. at 511.
180. Justice Brennan pointed out this problem in his dissent in Preiser:
Moreover, if the federal court is the first to reach decision, and if that court
concludes that the procedures are, in fact, unlawful, then the entire state pro-
ceeding must be immediately aborted, even though the state court may have
devoted substantial time and effort to its consideration of the case. By the same
token, if traditional principles of res judicata are applicable to suits under
§ 1983 .... the prior conclusion of the state court suit would effectively set at
naught the entire federal court proceeding. This is plainly a curious prescription
for improving relations between state and federal courts. Id.
1974]
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court's correct application of Preiser actually illustrated some of
the problems anticipated by the Preiser dissenters.
In Baskins v. Moore,'8' the Preiser decision was again found
to be applicable. This action was initiated by several state prison-
ers who sought an initial declaration that various parole board
procedures were unconstitutional. In granting the defendants'
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the court found that the only federal remedy
available to the petitioners was a writ of habeas corpus. Since the
petitioners had failed to seek relief under the Uniform Post Con-
viction Procedure Act, thus not exhausting available state reme-
dies, the court denied their claim.
8
1
This case, as does Curley, shows that the fears harbored by
many concerning the effect that the Preiser decision would have
on a prisoner's civil rights were not unfounded. It seems clear that
in the Baskins case the district court properly applied Preiser
since the majority in Preiser had recognized in dictum that the
scope of habeas corpus was not limited to requests for immediate
release and, in so doing, cited many of the same cases relied upon
by the court in Baskins.8 3 Therefore, when the court in Baskins
said that "[tjhe test fashioned by the [Supreme] Court requires
an analysis of the relief sought measured against the 'essence' and
'core' of habeas corpus,' '184 it correctly pointed out the major
issue of the case. In answering that issue the court clearly showed
that the scope of habeas corpus has been expanded to such an
extent that the Preiser decision would have a very serious and
widespread effect on the civil rights of prisoners. 15 The Preiser
decision may make exhaustion of state remedies a pre-requisite
to most actions by a prisoner in federal court to protect his civil
rights.
Earl Clayton Hipp, Jr.
James W. Peterson, Jr.
181. 362 F. Supp. 187 (D.S.C. 1973).
182. Id. at 191-92.
183. See 411 U.S. at 485-88.
184. 362 F. Supp. at 190.
185. For a criticism of this widespread effect see Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of
Habeas Corpus": the Supreme Court and the Limitations on a Prisoner's Right to Sue;
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 9 CINM. L. BULL. 518 (1973).
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